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Abstract
This paper analyses the welfare implications for a developing country of using union
legalisation as a policy instrument to attract inward foreign direct investment. While
its presence may discourage a foreign multinational (MNE) from locating in the host
country, unionisation is an important rent-extracting instrument for the host country.
We show that if the MNE benefits from dynamic effects, the host country government
may have an incentive to adopt temporary social dumping: banning the union in the
short run to extract higher rents in the future. However, if the government can use a
fiscal instrument in conjunction with union legalisation, the former can circumvent the
need to engage in social dumping.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A significant proportion of the discussion on globalisation, defined as an
expansion of both cross-border transactions in goods and services and inter-
national capital flows, has centred on its effects on the labour markets. Low
labour costs are often seen as a key factor in determining the ability of a
country to compete for export markets and for foreign direct investment
(FDI). Indeed, the growing importance of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in
world markets signifies that the competitive pressure has, to an extent, shifted
from firms themselves to workers in different countries bidding for their jobs
with the same multinational firm.
Labour organisations in industrial countries typically fear that the increased
competition from countries where labour standards are low, or not enforced,
will lead to a ‘race to the bottom’, which will compromise labour standards
in industrial countries as well. These fears are strengthened by the perceived
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LDCs’ governments’ reticence to ratify and implement International Labour
Conventions. Many LDCs have, in fact, shown opposition to the establish-
ment of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to their labour practices
by the International Labour Organisation,1 worrying that the industrialised
nations leading the charge for these mechanisms to be set up could use them as
protectionist tools to dull developing nations’ competitive advantages based
on low labour costs. This suggests that, in particular in those regions which
have to a great extent been bypassed by inward FDI flows (such as Africa and
South-Asia), governments may strategically choose to repress unionisation
and to pursue low labour standards in their attempt to preserve, and/or enhance,
their competitiveness in goods and FDI markets.
The aim of this paper is to explore the possibility of the strategic use
of labour standards by a developing country’s government trying to attract
inward FDI. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the strategic
use of labour standards as a policy instrument.
In the emerging literature on labour standards and international trade,
even when endogenously determined – as for example in Casella (1996) and
Srinivasan (1996) – standards are not treated as a policy variable. Similarly,
the relatively small but growing literature that explores the relationship
between labour market unionisation and FDI ignores the possibility of the
government’s strategic use of union legislation.2
To start addressing the issue of the optimal use of labour standards as trade
policy instruments, we construct a simple model in which a developing country’s
government makes strategic use of labour union legalisation to influence the
optimal behaviour of a foreign multinational that may potentially locate in the
country. The model does not aim at providing an exhaustive analysis of the
optimal use of standards to attract FDI, but rather to highlight the nature of
some of the factors affecting a government’s economic incentives to regulate
unionisation.
Leaving aside political economy considerations, unions may generate a
trade-off for the host country’s government.3 On the one hand, they represent
an important means of rent extraction. A Multinational Enterprise (MNE)
will typically hold firm specific ‘rent-yielding assets’ (Caves, 1996) and
the prospect of rent shifting may thus be attractive to both the host country
government and unions.4 On the other hand, a ‘union free environment’, which
is typically associated with lower wages, may be seen as useful by the host
country’s government in its attempt to attract and retain MNEs’ investment.5
In this paper we allow for the possibility that the MNE benefits from
dynamic effects such as, for example, consumer switching costs, brand loyalty
and learning by doing. In this context, the host government may have an
incentive to subsidise temporarily the MNE in order to enhance future potential
rent-extraction. One, indirect, way of doing this may be through ‘social dump-
ing’: banning the union in the short run may yield greater rents in the long run.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model and
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discusses the optimal policy with respect to union legalisation. In Section 3, a
jointly optimal policy mix in which the government has the use of a subsidy/
tax instrument is analysed. Section 4 draws some conclusions.
2. THE BASIC MODEL
To examine these issues, we use a very simple two-period partial equilibrium
model. We assume there is one multinational that is considering setting up in
this developing economy to serve export markets. The MNE uses local labour
but does not sell in the local market. No host country firms compete with
the foreign multinational.6 The two periods are linked through dynamic
economies of scale, in the sense that a higher first period output raises the
firm’s second period profits.
The host country’s government, which in principle would like to attract the
foreign firm, faces the dilemma of whether or not to legalise unions. At the
beginning of each period, the government decides whether to allow unions or
not for that period. In this section, we shall assume that the government does
not have subsidy/tax instruments at its disposal and it is only able to decide
whether to allow the union or not. This assumption, is relaxed in the next
section.
Unions are assumed to maximise total labour rents by choice of the union
wage. We ignore issues arising from the relative bargaining power of unions
and firms. Different relative bargaining powers of unions and employers are
not central to our concerns in this paper and would complicate the analysis
without yielding many additional insights. We also assume a right-to-manage
model, where firms decide on the level of output.
Thus, the model has two periods and consists of a dynamic game between
three players, the host country’s government, the union, and the foreign
multinational. We shall allow for the possibility that both the government and
the multinational may take a longer term view than the labour unions, whose
main preoccupation may be short-term wage increases and recognition. We
shall also consider the case in which the union’s rate of time preference is the
same as that of the government, and we shall compare the implications of this
alternative assumption for government policy towards unions.
In each period, the government first decides whether unions should be
legalised or not for the remainder of that period. In period one, following the
government decision about union legalisation, the MNE decides whether to
locate in the host country or not. We assume that once the MNE sets up in the
home country, it stays for the remainder of the game. We thus rule out any
relocation threat: if the MNE enters, it does not leave in period two.7 If unions
exist, they decide on the wage in each period in order to maximise total union
rents. Finally, in each period the MNE chooses its output.
In period t (t = 1, 2) the demand function of the MNE in its export market
is:
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q t = a t – pt (1)
The MNE faces marginal cost ct that is constant in its current output.
In order to introduce a dynamic link between period one output and
period two profits, it proves useful to write the gap between the demand inter-
cept and the marginal cost as:
a t – ct = At – w t + b q t–1 > 0 (2)
where At is a period specific constant, b  is a positive constant and w t is period
t wage. This is the simplest way of introducing beneficial dynamic effects,
which could arise on the demand side and/or on the cost side as a result of
consumers’ switching costs, brand loyalty, experience effects and distri-
butional scale economies, amongst other things. We shall further assume that
the MNE has a unit labour requirement, that is lt = q t where lt is the labour
employed by the multinational in the home country.
Note that At can be seen as reflecting market size. Let a  =A2/A1 capture
the evolution of At over time. Clearly, a  will affect the host country’s rent
extraction potential from the MNE. If a  < 1, the extent of the market facing the
MNE is shrinking over time, as will happen in a declining industry.
2.1 Period two
Period two begins with the government deciding whether to legalise the union
for the period. If legal, the union then chooses the wage. Finally, the MNE
chooses the second period output. The multistage game is solved in the usual
way by backward induction.
In the final stage of the second period, the MNE maximises period-two
profit ( p2 – c2)q2. The optimal output level is given by:
If the union does not exist, the wage paid by the MNE will be w 2 = w¯ ³  0.
Without loss of generality, we normalise the wage outside the multinational
sector at zero. Hence, we assume that w¯, the wage in the absence of a union, is
not less than the opportunity cost of labour in the country. If w¯ > 0 then even a
non-unionised multinational pays wages above the opportunity cost of labour.
This is a reasonable assumption, which conforms to the evidence of MNEs
paying higher wages than domestic firms (Caves, 1996). Let the union wage
be w t = wt. We are assuming that employment and wages have the same weight
in the unions’ utility function. One could allow for different weights and this
would raise other interesting considerations that are not, however, central to
the aims of this paper. If the union exists in the second period, then anticipating
the relationship in equation (3) it chooses the union wage w2 to maximise its
q
2
 = 
A
2
 -  w 2 + b q 1
2
(3)
Strategic use of standards 247
second period labour rent w2 q2. If the union does not exist, the labour rents are
w¯q2(w¯). Note that the union does not maximise (w2 – w¯)q2 because the wage
workers would get if not employed by the MNE is zero and not w¯ (the wage
the MNE would pay if there were no union). Hence, the union will solve the
following problem:
Max w2 q2 s.t. w2 ³  w¯ (4)
If this constraint binds, the presence of the union is irrelevant to the wage
determination, so for this reason we will assume that it never binds. In this
case, the equilibrium union wage is:
The second period equilibrium output will then be given by:
At the beginning of period two, the government chooses whether to legalise
the union or not. Assuming that all profits are repatriated, and in the absence of
domestic consumption, the government’s social welfare function is given by
G = w 1q1 + r gw 2 q2 (7)
where r g is the government’s discount factor. It is plausible to assume that the
government may not be able to commit in period one to its policy in period
two. In this case, in period two the government maximises the function
G2 = w 2q2 , which is equivalent to the union’s objective function in period
two.8 Hence, G2 is maximised by the same value of w2 that is chosen by the
union and given in equation (5). Therefore, assuming the government cannot
commit at the beginning of period one to ban the union in period two, and
given no relocation threat, the best policy in period two is always to legalise
the union.
2.2 Period one
In the last stage of period one, the MNE chooses the first period output to
maximise the intertemporal profit function:
p  = ( p1 – c1) q1 + r m(p2 – c2)q2 (8)
where r m is the MNE discount factor. It is straightforward to solve the MNE’s
optimal problem to find:
w2
(5)w 2 = 
A
2
 + b q 1
2
(6)
(A2 + b q1)/4 if w 2 = w2
(A2 – w¯ + b q1)/2 if w 2 = w¯
q2 =
ì
í
î
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q 1 = 
A
1
(1 + a r m b /8) -  w 1
(2 -  r m b 2/8)
(9)
w 1 = 
A
1
(1 + a r m b /8)
2
(10)
[A1(1 + a r m b /8) – w¯ ]/(2 – r m b 2 / 8) if w 1 = w¯
A1(1 + a b r m /8) / (4 – r m b 2 / 4) if w 1 = w 1
q1 =
ìí
î
(11)
(13)q 2 = 
A
1
{2a  + b } -  b w 1
8 -  r m b 2/2
Note that the first period output is increasing in a , in the discount factor r m
and in the dynamic returns to scale parameter b . The larger these parameters,
the greater the incentive the MNE has to produce above the short-run profit
maximising amount to exploit the higher discounted profit opportunity of the
second period.
If there is no union, then the MNE’s wage will be w 1 = w¯. However, if the
union is legalised in period one, it will optimally choose the wage to maximise
its objective function. It is plausible that the union has a discount factor that is
smaller than that of both the government and the MNE. We shall discuss later
the implications of the case in which r u = r g. First, we will consider the case in
which the union is more impatient than the government. Without too much
loss of generality, we shall assume that the union’s discount factor is zero9
(i.e. r u = 0). Thus, its utility function is U1 = w1q1 and the optimal wage will
be given by:
Note that the first period union wage is also increasing in a , b  and r m. The
more the firm produces in the first period to exploit future profit potential,
the larger are the available short-run rents that can be extracted by the
union. Hence, whether or not the multinational’s export market is contracting
or expanding over time will crucially affect the available labour rents in period
one.
Period one output can now be re-written as:
It is easy to show that the maximised profit of the MNE is:
p  = q 21 + r m q22 – r m b q1q2 (12)
where q1 is given by (11); making use of (9) in (6) and invoking the fact that it
is always optimal to legalise the union in period two, q2 becomes:
The MNE will enter if p  > p ¯ , where p ¯ reflects outside profit opportunities
which we take as exogenous. This is a standard small open economy
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assumption. Given that both q1 and q2 are ultimately only a function of w 1, the
MNE entry condition can be written as:
p ( w 1) – p ¯ > 0 (14)
where it is straightforward to show that 
dp
dw 1
 <  0. Thus, the higher is the
first period wage, the lower is the present value of the MNE’s profit. Let wˆ(p ¯)
be the wage rate at which p  = p ¯. Then, in period one the MNE would not enter
in the presence of a union if w1 ³  wˆ. If, instead, w1 < wˆ the presence of a union
would not deter the MNE’s entry. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these two possible
entry scenarios.
There is, of course, the possibility that w¯ ³  wˆ. In this case, the MNE will
never find it profitable to enter, even without a union in period one.
In general, the more intense is competition in the world market for FDI, the
higher is the reservation profit, and the less likely is entry with a union.
We now turn to stage one of the game where the government chooses the
period-one union legislation. The government’s objective function will be:
G( w 1) = U1( w 1) + r gU2(w 1) (15)
Unconditional maximisation of this function would set the socially optimal
wage for period one. Note that if the union had the same discount rate as the
government it would maximise the function in (15); in this case, the union
Figure 1 The case where the MNE will enter in the presence of a period one union
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wage would be socially optimal. Instead, when the union is more impatient
than the government, the wage it will choose will be above the optimal level
from the government’s point of view.
The function in (15) is concave in w 1 and will depend on the magnitude of
the structural parameters of the model (a , b , and the discount factors). w¯ is
exogenous and wˆ is inversely related to p¯ . The ranking in order of magnitude
of w¯ , wˆ and w1 will be crucial to determining optimal union legislation policy.
The decision regarding union legalisation in period one depends not only
on the magnitude of the MNE’s reservation profit (or wˆ ), but also on the
magnitude of w¯ (the wage that MNE pays in the absence of a union). Two cases
can be identified.
Case 1
When welfare is higher at w 1 =  w¯  than at w 1 = w1, that is when G(w¯) > G(w1),
the government will find it optimal to ban the union. In this case, the decision
to ban is independent of the size of wˆ (and hence of the size of the MNE’s
reservation profits); the government would ban the union even if the MNE
would enter with unionisation in period one. This case is illustrated in Figure
3, where t  is implicitly defined by G( t ) = G(w1) and t  < w1.
Case 1 obtains if w¯ lies in the interval between w 1 = t  and w 1 = w1.
Case 2
When welfare is at least as high at w 1 = w1 as it is at w 1 = w¯, that is G(w¯)
£  G(w1), two sub-cases emerge. In the first (Case 2.1) w1 ³  wˆ and the
government will find it optimal to ban the union because, with a union, the
Figure 2 The case where the MNE will not enter in the presence of a period one union
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MNE would not enter.10 This sub-case is illustrated in Figure 4.11 In the second
sub-case (Case 2.2), illustrated in Figure 5, w1 < wˆ and the government will
find it optimal to legalise the union if G(w¯) < G(w1) and be indifferent if G(w¯)
= G(w1).
In both Cases 1 and 2 above, illustrated in Figures 3 to 5, w1 is to the right of
the maximum point on the G(w 1) curve. This reflects the assumption that the
union has a lower discount factor than the government. If it did have the same
Figure 3 Case 1: G(w¯) > G(w1). Not optimal for the Government to legalise period one
union
Figure 4  Case 2.1: G(w1) ³  G(w¯) and w1 ³  wˆ. Not optimal for the Government to legalise
period one union
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discount factor as the government, w1 (the wage chosen by the union) would
maximise G(w 1). In that instance, Case 1 would not apply because the interval
between t  and w1 would disappear. Case 1, in which it is optimal to ban the
union because G(w¯) > G(w1), can occur only if there is a ‘time preference
differential ’ between the union and the government. Note, however, that when
there is no difference in the time preference parameters, that is when r u = r g,
there will still be a case for banning the union if w1 ³  wˆ. Clearly, this motive for
banning the union is due to a ‘time consistency’ problem which stems from the
sequence of the game, with the MNE having to make its location decision
before the union sets the wage.12 Hence, a time consistency problem would
always arise when w1 ³  wˆ, regardless of whether or not the union has the same
discount factor as the government. Thus, although it is more likely when the
union is more impatient than the government, temporary social dumping
can occur even when no difference in time preference exists between the
government and the union.
We carried out some simulation exercises on the model. For the parameter
values A1 = a  = 1, b  = 0.2, r g = r m = 1 and r u = 0, we found13 that w1 is approxi-
mately 0.51 which is above the value of w 1 (of approximately 0.485) which
maximises G( w 1). For these parameter values, we found that t  is about 0.46.
For p ¯  above approximately 0.12, we get wˆ > w1 (as in Figures 1 and 5), and for
p ¯  lower than this gives wˆ < w1 as in the case of Figures 2 and 4. From these
simulations we learn that (1) each of the above cases can occur, but (2) the
interval ( t , w1) is very small, so that Case 1 will only be observed for a very
narrow range of parameter values, and (3) w1 is very close to the level of w 1
that maximises G( w 1). Hence, somewhat surprisingly, even a big difference
between the discount factor of the government and that of the union does not
Figure 5 Case 2.2: G(w1) ³  G(w¯) and w1 < wˆ. Optimal for the Government to legalise
period one union
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lead to the wage set by the union being very far from the socially optimal
wage.
Clearly, the nature of the optimal policy towards the legalisation of the
union in period one of the game crucially depends, ceteris paribus , on the
magnitude of the MNE’s reservation profit that is taken to be exogenous in this
model. Several factors may be thought to affect the reservation profits of the
MNE. For example, the outside profit of the MNE will be positively related to
the availability of other potential FDI destinations characterised by favourable
conditions, as for instance low labour costs and/or lack of unionisation. If
the multinational’s choice of the host country reflects geographical proximity
considerations to third market destinations, then the reservation profit will
also be affected by the reduction of transport costs and other barriers to trade
that may reduce the incentive of the MNE to invest abroad and may make it
more profitable to serve foreign markets from the home country.
3. PRODUCTION SUBSIDIES
So far, we have assumed that the only policy available to the government is
union legislation. A more direct way of attracting the multinational, however,
would be through the use of a fiscal policy instrument such as, for example, a
production subsidy. In this section we allow for the use of both production
subsidies and union legislation, and derive the jointly optimal policy mix.
Our aim is to discuss how the availability of a fiscal instrument affects the
government’s optimal choice about union legalisation.
The profit function in (8) is thus modified and is now given by:
p  = ( p1 – c1 + s1)q1 + r m( p2 – c2 + s2)q2 (16)
It is straightforward to show that the second period output is:
which collapses to (6) when s2 = 0. The second period wage is now given by:
As before, we assume that the non-union wage is w¯ smaller than w2.
In either case, the government maximises:
A
2
 + b q
1
 + s
2
4
(17)
if w 2 = w2
if w 2 = w¯
q2 =
ì
í
î A2 -  w + b q1 + s 2
2
¯
ì
í
î
(18)w 2 =
w¯
with union
without union
w
2
 = 
A
2
 + b q
1
 + s
2
2
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w -  
A
2
 + b q
1
2
 ¯
so2 =
0 for w 2 = w 2ì
í
î
(20)
(21)q 2 = 
A2 + b q1
4
q
1
 = 
A
1
(1 + a r m b /8) -  w
1
 + s
1
(2 -  r m b 2/8)
(22)
with union
without union
(23)w 1 =
w¯
w
1
 = 
A
1
(1 + a r m b /8) + s
1
2
ì
í
î
for w
2
 = w¯
G2 = ( w 2 – s2 ) q 2 (19)
to yield the optimal subsidy:
With a union in period two, the optimal policy would be not to tax/subsidise
the MNE. In the absence of a union and when 0 £  w¯ < w2 , we get s o2 < 0, that is
the optimal policy is a tax. Now, making use of (20) in (17), we get the output
level:
Clearly, period two output is the same with and without a union. This means
that the production tax compensates for the existence of the union and can be
used to reach the same real equilibrium. The reason for this is that the tax/
subsidy instrument is a perfect rent extracting substitute for the union. From
(18) and (20) it is straightforward to show that the per-unit rent extracted, i.e.
the equilibrium wage net of subsidy, is the same with or without a union. That
is w 2 – s o2 = (A2 + b q1)/2.
The second period welfare level will, therefore, be rewritten as G2 = 2q
2
2,
which from (21) is the same both with and without a union. This implies
that, given our simple utilitarian welfare function, the same welfare level is
achieved under both union regimes. If there is no relocation threat, and the
government can use a fiscal instrument to extract rents from the multinational,
the union regime in period two is no longer crucial.
In period one, the MNE maximises the function in (16) to get the output
level:
Assuming r u = 0, the wage in period one will be:
In stage 1, the government decides its union legalisation and sets its subsidy
s1. As in the previous section, it may face a binding foreign profit constraint.
As a prelude to the constrained optimal case, let us consider the special case in
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which the multinational’s entry profit constraint is not binding. The govern-
ment then maximises the following unconstrained intertemporal welfare function:
G = ( w 1 – s1) q1 + 2 r gq22 (24)
It is straightforward to show that the optimal subsidy is:
Equation (25) holds for both union legalisation regimes, with the appropriate
w 1 given in equation (23) above. Substituting from (23) and rearranging yields
the unconstrained optimal subsidy with a union s u1 and without a union s
n
1,
which are respectively given by:
and
s n1 = s
u
1 – (w1 – w¯) (27)
Notice that there are two effects in determining the sign of the first period
subsidy. First, with or without the union, the government has an incentive to
subsidise the MNE to encourage it to exploit its dynamic economies of scale in
order to raise employment and rents over the two periods. This is captured by
equation (26), which is also the first term of (27). Note that this will be zero if
the government had the same degree of impatience as the union. The second
effect occurs in the absence of a union and captures the incentive of the
government to extract rent directly. This effect works towards a tax and is
captured by the second term on the right-hand side of (27).
To summarise, optimal subsidies tend to fall through time. With a union
legalised in both periods, it is optimal to subsidise in period one but to set the
second period subsidy equal to zero. Without a union it may be optimal to
subsidise in the first period but it will always be optimal to tax in period two.
It proves useful to consider the ‘first-period per-unit rent’, defined as
d 1 = w 1 – s1, which gives us a measure of the rent extracted (i.e. the wage net of
subsidy) by the country from the MNE in that period. Hence, we can think
of the optimal policy as one of choosing the optimal per-unit rent. The first-
period optimal policy can then be re-written as
d o1 = w 1 – s o1 = w1 – su1 (28)
It is clear from (28) that, given the union legislation, the optimal policy can be
thought of as choosing the ‘first-period per-unit rent’ in order to maximise the
welfare function in (24). Clearly, we would expect that the amount of rent that
can be extracted will be less if the government has to take account of a binding
(25)s o1 = w 1 -  2 -  r
m
 
b
2
8
 -  r g 
b
2
4
 q 1 + r
g
 
b
4
 a A1
(26)s u1 =  
r g b ( a A1 + b q 1)
4
 > 0 
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entry constraint. When the MNE’s profit constraint is binding, the government
optimisation problem will be to maximise the Lagrangian
L( d 1, l ) = d 1q1( d 1) + 2 r g(q2(d 1))2 + l ( p ( d 1) – p¯ ) (29)
to yield
where d c1 is defined as the constrained optimal first-period per-unit rent. It
is straightforward to show that equation (30) implies a higher level of sub-
sidisation than in the unconstrained case. It is also easy to show that an
increase in the MNE’s reservation profit reduces the ability of the home
country to extract rent.
It is clear that welfare is the same with or without the union, because the
government will use the subsidy to correct for the presence of the union. The
equality of the welfare outcomes across union regimes then implies that, even
in period one, union legalisation is no longer the crucial factor in the attempt to
attract FDI. This goes against the popular perception that unionisation is a
major deterrent of FDI.
Clearly, the simple welfare function we use takes no explicit account
of political economy considerations that may be particularly relevant in a
developing economy setting. These may include international pressure to
legalise unions, dead-weight costs associated with raising taxation, and
inefficient activities such as government corruption. Note, however, that to the
extent that these factors are important, they may bias the decision in favour of
union legalisation. Essentially, there are two ways of extracting rent from
the MNE: taxes and higher wages. If, for example, the public administration
suffers from high levels of inefficiencies and corruption, then higher wages
may have an advantage over taxation in that the extracted rents go directly
into the hands of the private sector. Of course, governments may have other
political motives for banning unions, but these are unlikely to be welfare
increasing. Also, a policy based on production subsidy may be difficult, if
raising the funds to finance it imposes a dead-weight cost on society. If a pro-
duction subsidy could only be used with a positive social cost of funds, then it
will not be a perfect substitute for union legislation. If the social cost of funds
was prohibitively high, so that a production subsidy could not be used, the
relevance of the analysis of Section 2 would be strengthened.
Finally, note that if the government could control the union, as in the case of
an official state union, then it could set the wage w1 = d 1 before the MNE
enters, thus rendering production subsidies redundant, although even in this
case, time consistency issues may arise.
 (30)d c1 =  2 -  r
m b
2
8
 -  r g
b
2
4
 q
1
 -  r g
b
4
 a A1 + 2 -  r
m b
2
8
 l p ¢( d 1)
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4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have explored the strategic use of labour union legalisation by
a developing country’s government concerned with attracting inward FDI.
We show that when considering whether to legalise the unions or not, the
host country government faces a trade-off. On the one hand, unions represent
an attractive tool for rent extraction in the presence of foreign multinationals.
On the other hand, however, unionisation can make the location in the
host country less attractive to the foreign investor. This trade-off raises the
incentive for the host country government to use temporary social dumping in
the form of restricted union rights.
Another of our results shows that production subsidies can circumvent the
need to engage in this form of social dumping. That is, if the government
has another fiscal instrument at its disposal, union legalisation is no longer a
crucial factor in attracting inward FDI. This result goes against the popular
perception that unionisation is a major deterrent of FDI.
A production subsidy is a direct way of raising employment, but another
policy instrument that could be considered is lump-sum profit subsidies/taxes.
If the government can use both of these fiscal instruments, then it would set the
after-tax profit of the multinational just equal to the latter’s reservation profit,
thus ensuring inward FDI and at the same time extracting all available rent.
The outcome would be independent of union legislation, in line with our result
in Section 3.
In this paper, the focus was on the possibility of temporary, rather than per-
manent, social dumping. Although the temporary aspect clearly requires us to
use a multi-period model, optimal social dumping per se could, of course,
emerge in other settings, including single-period ones. For example, intra-
temporal positive externalities between the MNE and the rest of the local
economy may also create such an incentive.
One could extend the model in a number of ways. For example, the inclu-
sion of an export oriented domestic sector would allow for the modelling of
one of the main attractions of inward FDI for developing countries, namely
the positive technological externalities from foreign MNEs to the domestic
economy. Such externalities, however, are likely to strengthen the case for
temporary social dumping, since they would make inward FDI more attractive
to the host country’s government. Hence, this would be unlikely to alter sig-
nificantly the basic insights of the current model. Also, the model developed
here rules out, by assumption, the possibility of MNE’s relocation. Clearly, a
relocation threat is a reality in many industries, particularly those charac-
terised by relatively low set up and relocation costs. Relocation, by strengthen-
ing competition between countries, would make the danger of a ‘race to the
bottom’ in labour standards more likely, thus increasing an LDC’s government
incentives for social dumping. Explicitly allowing for this in this frame-
work would be fairly straightforward and would probably have fairly obvious
implications.
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NOTES
1 The 86th International Labour Conference (June 1998) has adopted a Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, committing ILO’s members to uphold
fundamental rights in the workplace (freedom of association, right to collective
bargaining, progressive elimination of forms of forced labour, child labour and
discrimination).
2 See Zhao (1995, 1998) for the emergence of cross-hauling FDI between two union-
ised countries. Naylor and Santoni (1998) analyse the effects of union power and
degree of substitutability between products on FDI. Leahy and Montagna (2000)
investigate the effects of different degrees of wage setting centralisation on the
investment and location decisions of a MNE.
3 Although the presence of unions may raise political economy considerations, we
shall use the standard assumption that the government is a benevolent national wel-
fare maximiser.
4 Katrak (1977) and Brander and Spencer (1981) analyse the use of rent-extracting
tariffs in the presence of a foreign monopoly selling in the domestic market. Bughin
and Vannini (1995) and Leahy and Montagna (2000) explore the relationship between
unionisation and rent extraction from a foreign multinational.
5 On balance, governments see inward FDI as desirable, even in the absence of union
rent extraction. MNEs are seen as a source of employment and will typically pay
higher wages than local firms even in the absence of unionisation, due perhaps to
efficiency wage considerations or other factors. Additionally, MNEs are seen as
generating positive technological externalities, and procompetitive effects on
industry.
6 Leahy and Montagna (2000) analyse direct product market competition between a
foreign multinational and domestic firms in the presence of rent extracting unions.
7 This would be typical of an industry characterised by high sunk costs of entry, such as
oil refining and extraction.
8 As shown in the next section, this would be modified if the government had a
production tax/subsidy instrument.
9 Qualitatively, the results will go through for all r u < r g. For ease of exposition we
focus on the case of r u = 0.
10 Of course, if w¯ ³  wˆ then even banning the union would be insufficient to induce entry
of the MNE.
11 In the figure, wˆ is shown on the upward sloping portion of G( w 1), but clearly in Case
2.1 it could be elsewhere on the curve, provided that w1 ³  wˆ .
12 For this move order to be reversed, we would require the union to commit in advance
to a wage for an unrealistically long time. Clearly, any wage set before the MNE’s
entry is likely to be sub-optimal because it would be based on a guess about the future
profitability of the MNE. Hence, we believe the sequence chosen is by far the most
plausible.
13 The qualitative results are quite robust with respect to changes in these parameter
values.
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